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I INTRODUCTION 
Many individuals rely on the advice of their stockbrokers 
to determine their investment strategies. The aim of this 
paper is to examine the nature of this advisory role and 
determine whether or not the broker owes a legal duty of 
care to his client, beyond that of giving honest advice. 
It is naturally in the best financial interest of a broker 
to give careful and good advice in order to enhance his 
business reputation, but is there a legal duty to do so 
as well? 
First, the nature of the broker-client relationship will 
be examined. The general tort liability for negligent 
misstat.etrents will then be discussed and related to the 
role of the stockbroker in particular. Finally, the 
operation of a disclaimer will be examined, and the question 
of causation and damages in the event of a duty arising will 
be addressed. 
II THE WORK OF BROKERS (IN GIVING INVESTMENT ADVICE) 
For many clients a stockbroker acts merely as an agent 
on their behalf in the purchase and sale of securities. 
The client makes the decision as to which transactions 
are to be carried out, issues the broker with instructions 
and the broker is charged only with the execution of those 
instructions. The broker is a dealer, and his only liability 
to the client for negligence would be on a contractual basis, 
where he had failed to execute those instructions with 
reasonable care. 
On the other hand, probably the majority of investors, both 
private and institutional, rely on the advice given to them 
by their brokers,in deciding about investment in various 
securities. It is a principal function of broking firms 
to provide such advice for their clients, and even to 
non-clients as well. Most metropolitan firms have research 
departments whose function it is to assess the relative 
merits of investment in various securities, with a view to 
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relaying these opinions in the form of investment recorrunend-
ations. Additionally, these research departments are likely 
to accumulate data on companies and industries,and are in 
a position to relay factual information as well. 
Advice on the relative merits of different investments 
can be given in various ways. First, a private individual 
or an institutional representative may telephone or visit 
a broker for a discussion of his investment portfolio. The 
investment advice or information is given gratuitously. 
The reward for the broker is the possibility that the 
individual or institution will subsequently place an order 
to buy or sell securities, and will therefore pay brokerage 
on the transaction. There is a clear distinction to be 
drawn between this practice and that which sometimes occurs 
in some overseas countries (notably the United States), 
where a broker is paid a fixed retainer in return for 
providing investment advice. In New Zealand, the advice is 
not charged for, and may in fact be given to clients and 
non-clients alike. 
2 
A second situation is where an investment recommendation is 
prepared and sent out to all or some of the existing clients 
of a broking firm. This may take the form of a 'market letter' 
and deal with the merits of a number of securities, or it 
may be a 'special recommendation' focusing on one particular 
security. The recommendation made will generally suggest 
the buying or selling of particular securities, although 
more general matters may be dealt with. 
Finally, a written recommendation may be prepared for a 
specific client. This is likely to be more detailed than 
a 'market letter', and tailored to the client's individual 
circumstances. 
It is to be stressed that the investment advice given by 
brokers does not consist solely of their opinions as to 
the 'buys' and 'sells' of ordinary shares quoted on the 
stock exchange. In each situation identified above, a broker 
may provide purely factual information, for example as to the 
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yield and security of an investment or as to the payment of 
dividends. There need be no element of opinion in the 
broker's investment advice. 
THE NATURE OF THE RELATIONSHIP BETWEEN BROKER AND CLIENT 
A difficulty arises in determining the exact legal 
description of the relationship between the stockbroker 
giving advice and the person to whom the advice is given. 
According to the circumstances, the relationship could be 
contractual, fiduciary or "special", leading to different 
duties of care and consequent liabilities arising. 
Contractual 
As already discussed in Part II, investment advice is 
generally given gratuitously in New Zealand. Therefore 
there is no direct contractual relationship between the 
parties, in which the broker provides investment advice 
in return for a fee from his client, and through which 
the client could sue the broker for negligently given advice. 
On the other hand, it can be argued that a broker only 
makes an investment recommendation in an effort to induce 
a contract between himself and the recipient of the inform-
ation, namely a contract to buy or sell shares. In many 
situations, of course, there will be no contract arising -
the recipient is quite entitled to place his order with a 
different broker, or the advice may be not to sell a 
particular security. In a large number of cases however, 
investment advice given by a broker will induce the recipient 
to place an order with that broker, and hence enter into a 
·contract with him. 
Under section 6 of the Contractual Remedies Act 1979, where 
a party to a contract has been induced to enter into it by 
an innocent (or fraudulent) misrepresentation made by the 
3 
other party to the contract, that misrepresentation shall be 
taken to be a term of the contract. The wronged party will 
then have an action for breach of contract, and it is expressly 
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provided in section 6 (1) (b) that any action in tort 
for negligent misrepresentation is excluded. Relating the 
operation of this section to the relationship between broker 
and client, if the client can show that the advice included 
a misrepresentation and that it induced him to place an 
order to buy the security, then the misrepresentation will 
4 
be treated as a term of the contract. The contract in question 
is one of agency, in which the broker agrees to purchase the 
security on behalf of his client in return for remuneration 
in the form of brokerage. The investment advice is treated 
as a term of the contract, and the fact that it contains a 
misrepresentation means that the term is broken and the 
client has an action for breach of contract. 
The operation of section 6 is absolute, in the sense that 
there is no need for the plaintiff to establish negligence 
on the part of his adviser. As Dawson and McLauchlan 
1 
point out, "[t]he philosophy behind the section is that 
where a person has made a representation which induces 
another to contract with him, he should be responsible 
for the accuracy of the representation irrespective of 
2 fault." Therefore, where a broker makes a misrepresent-
ation in the course of giving inve~tment advice, and that 
misrepresentation induces a contract, it is not sufficient 
for him to show that he exercised due care in formulating the 
statement. If the statement is incorrect, he will be bound 
by it regardless. 
In the case of brokers giving advice, the ambit of section 
6 depends upon the meaning of the word "misrepresentation". 
Misstatements of opinion, as opposed to misstatements of 
fact, are not normally actionable in contract, and section 
6 deals with "misrepresentations" which have previously been 
defined as false statements of existing or past facts. 
3 
Dawson and McLauchlan consider that there is a clear intention 
that this common law definition is to apply to the section: 
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To constitute a representation there must 
be words which expressly or impliedly state a 
fact or some positive conduct which is tantamount 
to a statement of fact. 4 
Therefore, section 6 is intended to cover misstatements 
5 
of fact, and does not extend to erroneously formed opinions. 
5 In the Chancery case of Brown v. Raphael it was held that 
where the speaker has an appreciably greater knowledge or 
means of knowledge than the recipient, his statement of 
opinion will be taken to include a statement of fact that 
he had reasonable grounds for forming the opinion. In that 
case, an erroneous statement made by a solicitor that the 
annuitant was "believed to have no aggregable estate", was 
held to include a misrepresentation that the solicitor had 
reasonable grounds for his belief. Relating this to the 
situation of the stockbroker, where the broker gives an 
opinion (as opposed to a bald statement of fact), he 
will be taken to have made an implied representation that 
he has reasonable grounds for his opinion, the broker having 
a greater means of knowledge in the investment area than 
the advisee. Therefore, a statement of opinion can also be 
caught as a "misrepresentation" inducing a contract. 
It can be argued that section 6 of the Contractual Remedies 
Act will always cover the advice given by a broker, under 
the Brown v. Raphael principles. It will be very seldom that 
the broker does not have an appreciably greater knowledge in 
the area of investments than the person he is advising. 
However, in Brown v. Raphael Lord Evershed quoted with 
approval 6 the comment of the trial judge Upjohn J. that 
such an implied statement fact was made "where the opinion 
is expressed on facts assumed to be available to the vendor, 
which certainly are not available to the purchaser, and that 
opinion is expressed to induce that contract ... ". Thus it 
would appear that such a statement of fact will only be implied 
where the speaker expresses an opinion which is itself in 
regard to an ascertainable fact. Every statement of opinion 
made by a speaker with a greater means of knowledge in the 
area will not involve an implied statement of fact that the 
speaker has reasonable grounds on which to base his opinion. 
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The investment advice given by a broker is usually in 
the form of a statement of opinion about future events, 
rather than of current facts. However, an example of 
the latter situation is where a client purchases a 
particular ordinary share because his broker has told him 
that the company in question is able to pay dividends which 
will be tax-free in the hands of shareholders. If this 
was not, in fact, correct and the client had to pay tax 
on the dividends received, then he would have an action 
in contract on the basis of section 6 of the Contractual 
Remedies Act, and any tort action would be precluded. He 
would not have to show actual loss, for the measure of 
damages in contract represents the restitution of the 
plaintiff to the position he would have been in, had 
the misrepresentation been true. Thus,he could recover 
for reduced profits, and not only for actual losses incurred. 
Where the advice involves no statement of fact, whether 
express or implied, or where no contract is in fact induced, 
no action in contract will be available to the client who 
has been the victim of incorrect advice. Any action will 
have to be brought under some other head. 
Fiduciary 
In the Canadian case of Elderkin v. Merrill Lynch, Royal 
Securities Ltd 7 where the broking firm had negligently 
advised a client to purchase securities which subsequently 
became worthless, Cooper J.A. stated that: 
There is clear authority that a fiduciary 
relationship may exist between a stockbroker 
and his client. 8 
He went on to find that the defendants were also liable for 
negligent advice under the Hedley Byrne 9 principle. The 
6 
duty on the part of an adviser who is in a fiduciary position 
is to advise "carefully, fully, honestly, and in good faith 11 ,
10 
this being a higher standard than the Hedley Byrne requirement 
of absence of negligence. Under a fiduciary duty, the 
adviser must not withhold information or take undisclosed 
personal benefit. Once a fiduciary relationship is found to 
exist, the duty is imposed rather than assumed, and hence 
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any disclaimer of liability would be inoperative as 
inconsistent with the existence of such a relationship 
in the first place. 
The traditional basis for the finding of a fiduciary 
relationship comes from the judgment of Lord Chelmsford L.C. 
in Tate v. Williamson: 
11 
Wherever two persons stand in such a relation 
that, while it continues, confidence is 
necessarily reposed by one, and the influence 
which naturally grows out of that confidence 
is possessed by the other, and this confidence 
is abused, or the influence is exerted to obtain 
an advantage at the expense of the confiding party, 
the person so availing himself of his position 
will not be permitted to retain the advantage ... 
It is clear that a person who relies on the advice of another 
in making investment decisions is 'reposing confidence in 
him'. However, a broker is not usually in the position of 
being able to 'abuse' this relationship for his own financial 
gain. In the Elderkin 
12 case, the member of the firm which 
was advising the plaintiff about a particular company himself 
had a sizeable number of shares in it. Therefore, any 
investment on the part of the plaintiff would be to his 
advantage, in that the buying interest would enhance the 
share price . 
It is possible that a broker may indeed have a financial 
interest in the securities he recommends. In such a case, 
he could be placed in a position where he is able to abuse 
the trust placed in him, and a fiduciary duty would be imposed 
upon him. If he did abuse his position and obtain personal 
gain, then the client would be able to bring an action for 
breach of a fiduciary duty. Similarly, where a broker acts 
as a principal to his clients, he must fully disclose that 
he is so acting 13 Any recommendation made to purchase 
securities actually owned by the broker must therefore contain 
a statement of this fact. 
However, in the normal course of a broker advising his 
clients and potential clients, he has no personal interest 
7 
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in the securities, or if he has any interest it is of 
such a small magnitude as to be insignificant. In some 
instances, recommendations made by brokers include a 
statement to the effect that members of the firm hold 
securities in the relevant company. This may be an 
attempt on their part to discharge their fiduciary duty 
of 'full and honest disclosure', and is in fact required 
by the Stock Exchange Regulations. 
14 The usual situation 
is that there is no conflict of interest at all. 
In the English High Court decision of Woods v. Martins 
15 
Bank Ltd , Salmon J. held that where a bank manager had 
undertaken to be the financial adviser to a client of the 
bank, a fiduciary relationship between the client and the 
bank was thereby created. Although it could be argued that 
the relationship was given the "fiduciary'' status because 
the investments recommended by the bank manager resulted 
in the reduction of the overdraft of another of the bank's 
clients, Lord Hodson commented in Hedley Byrne 
16 
For my part, I should have thought that even 
if the learned judge put a strained interpretation 
on the word 'fiduciary' which is based on the idea 
of trust, the decision can be properly sustained as 
an example involving a special relationship. 
Lord Hodson emphasised the nature of a fiduciary relationship 
as one involving 'trust', implying that in such a situation 
the 'trustee' should not be able to take a personal advantage 
from his confidential position. 
While a fiduciary relationship may be found to exist in 
certain limited circumstances, and give rise to a distinct 
fiduciary obligation, it will not usually arise in the case 
8 
of a stock-broker. The ordinary giving of investment advice, 
without a personal financial interest on the part of the adviser, 
fits far more comfortably, if at all, within the concept of 
a "special" relationship. 
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"Special" 
Having discussed the limited circumstances in which the 
relationship between broker and client may be contractual 
or fiduciary, the paper will accordingly go on to deal 
with the more usual situations in which investment advice 
is given. The basic question to be addressed is whether 
or not the relationship between broker and client is a 
"special" one within the Hedley Byrne parameters, and hence 
whether a broker owes a duty of care to his client when 
giving investment advice, beyond a duty merely to be honest. 
TORT LIABILITY FOR NEGLIGENT MISSTATEMENTS IN GENERAL 
The Hedley Byrne decision established the doctrine that 
a professional person could owe a duty of care in tort, 
quite irrespective of any contractual or fiduciary duty 
owed to a client, and that he could be liable for financial 
as opposed to physical loss. While the Hedley Byrne decision 
has been modified somewhat by subsequent cases, it is still 
the basis upon which tortious liability for negligent 
misstatements is founded. 
Before Hedley Byrne, the Courts had not been prepared to allow 
a successful tort action of any kind for a misstatement, as 
long as it had not been made dishonestly 
17 . Liability only 
arose where there was a contractual relationship between the 
. h h f"d . 1 · h " 18 parties, or were t ere was some 1 uciary re ations 1p. 
In Hedley Byrne, however, it was established that where the 
parties were in a "special" though not contractual or fiduciary 
relationship, a duty of care in the making of statements could 
arise. 
The various components required in Hedley Byrne to constitute 
a "special" relationship illustrate the desire of the Court to 
make a clear differentiation between negligence in word, 
and negligence in deed. Words were seen as generally being used 
with less care, often in informal situations and having a much 
greater chance of causing damage because of their wide potential 
audience. Therefore, although there was a need for a duty 
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to apply with respect to the giving of information or 
advice, this duty had to be limited, the 'neighbourhood' 
test 19 being too wide. 
It may be doubted whether the distinction between negligence 
in word and negligence in deed is as important now as it . 
appeared to be in the Hedley Byrne decision. It is to be 
remembered that Hedley Byrne was breaking new ground in 
allowing actions to be brought for negligent misstatements, 
not arising in the course of a contractual or fiduciary 
relationship, and their Lordships may have felt that to 
impose the same criteria as for physical negligence would 
be altogether too dramatic a step at that stage. In the 
20 Scott Group case, Woodhouse J. questioned whether there 
10 
should be any difference between the liability attaching for 
the use of negligent words and that for the carrying out of 
negligent acts. 21 He felt that there would be no great flood 
of litigation if Lord Atkin's test 22 was applied to words as 
well as deeds, and that in the case of professional advisers, 
insurance to cover such claims could be easily arranged. 
Cooke J. on the other hand treated the imposition of a duty as 
more of a policy matter, one of the factors to be taken into 
account being whether the negligence was in word or deed. 23 
Nevertheless, the distinction certainly appears to be less 
important now than it was stressed to be in Hedley Byrne. 
The principal components of the Hedley Byrne test for a 
"special" relationship can be summarized as follows: 
(1) The plaintiff relied on the information or 
advice given. 
(2) It was foreseeable that the plaintiff could 
rely on what the defendant said, and it was 
reasonable for him to do so in the circumstances. 
(3) The defendant issued no clear qualification that 
he did not accept responsibility. 
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While there may not have been complete unanimity of thought 
amongst their Lordships as to the exact meaning of these 
requirements, it is probably more important to examine 
the law as it has developed through later decisions, than 
the individual variations in Hedley Byrne. 
The main developments subsequent to the House of Lords 
decision have been concerned with the second component, 
namely exactly when it is reasonable to rely on a statement 
made. While there is a general acceptance of the idea that 
no liability should attach to statements made in an informal 
or social setting, the Hedley Byrne doctrine appears to have 
been limited by the Australian Privy Council decision in 
11 
M.L.C. v. Evatt ~4 to apply to professional people or those in 
the business of giving advice only. In that case, which is 
probably binding authority in New Zealand, Lord Diplock for the 
majority said that the duty extended to those whose business , 
or profession involved the giving of advice (of a kind calling 
for special skill and competence} and those who let it be known 
that they claimed to possess skill and competence in the subject-
matter in question. 25 This has been followed in the New Zealand 
Supreme Court, 26 where it was emphasised that the subject-~atter 
of the statement had to require some special skill or competence 
not possessed by the ordinary reasonable person. 
Although the appellants in the Hedley Byrne case had specific-
ally sought the information from their advisers, this does not 
seem to be a necessary prerequisite in finding a "special" ~ 
relationship. In the New Zealand Court of Appeal decision in 
Scott Group for example, a duty could still arise where the 
information had been received unsolicited. The question 
of whether the advice or information was sought will therefore 
only go towards indicating whether or not reliance was reasonable 
in the circumstances. 
In contrast to the contractual situation, from the Hedley 
Byrne decision onwards, no attempt has been made to differentiate 
between advice (opinion} and information (fact} tendered.
27 
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Again, however, there could be some distinction when 
establishing what was reasonable reliance. When an adviser 
is stating an opinion, rather than conveying information, 
then the recipient is surely less able to place reliance 
on what is being said. 
Finally, it seems to be reasonably settled that a tortious 
duty of care, of the type which applied in Hedley Byrne, 
can arise even though the parties are in a pre-contractual 
situation. The duty of care can exist quite independently, 
as long as the advice is not within the ambit of a pre-
contractual "misrepresentation" inducing the contract as in 
section 6 of the Contractual Remedies Act. This position was 
dealt with by Greer L.J. in Jarvis v. Moy, Davies,Smith, 
Vandervell & Co: 
..• where the breach of duty alleged arises out 
of a liability independently of the personal 
obligation undertaken by contract, it is tort, 
and it may be tort even though there may happen to 
be a contract between the parties, if the duty in 
fact arises independently of that contract. 
Therefore, as long as the contract which is formed between 
the parties is not a contract to provide information or advice 
in return for a fee, a duty of care can arise in tort under 
the Hedley Byrne principles. This proposition is supported 
12 
by the decision of Lawson J. in Esso Petroleum Co Ltd v Mardon~
9 
where a duty of care in making pre-contractual statements was 
held to exist even though the statement was treated as a 
contractual warranty as well. Also in the recent English High 
Court case of Ross v. Caunters,
30 it was held that a negligent 
solicitor could be liable not only to his client in contract, 
but also in tort to his client and to others to whom he owed 
a prima facie duty of care. Therefore, the only time when a 
duty in tort is definitely excluded is when section 6 of the 
Contractual Remedies Act applies. 
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STOCKBROKERS' ADVICE AND A DUTY OF CARE 
There are very few reported cases involving negligence on 
the part of brokers, and even fewer dealing with the 
question of negligent advice tendered. There have been 
statements made as to the general duty a broker has towards 
his client, but these have generally been in connection with 
the proper execution of the client's instructions. For 
example, in a recent Australian decision 31 Street J.said 
Clients, some with great, others with little, 
business acumen and ability to protect themselves, 
seek and act on his advice and permit him to handle 
their money and their shares. Those clients are 
entitled to expect from a broker not only competence 
I 
13 
but also integrity and absence of conflicting personal 
interests. 
Whilst accepting that the broker may be under certain 
contractual duties to his client with regard to the execution 
of the client's orders, the object of this paper is to consider 
the broader issue of negligently given advice, and the question 
of what duty, if any, attaches to the professional investment 
adviser. Two particular situations have already been disting-
uished in Part III . . Firstly, where a misstatement of fact is 
made by a broker, and it induces the client to place an order, 
that misstatement will be taken to form a part of the contract, 
and only an action for breach of contract will lie. Secondly, 
where the broker has some personal financial interest in the 
securities recommended,the action would be for breach of~ 
fiduciary duty. In other cases the remedy, if any, will be 
in tort under the Hedley Byrne principles. 
As already discussed in Part IV the test laid down initially 
in Hedley Byrne for determining whether a duty of care arose 
in the making of statements must be taken to have been 
modified by New Zealand and other courts. Nevertheless, the 
Hedley Byrne decision still forms the backbone of any such 
analysis. 
The first component identified in the Hedley Byrne test was 
that the plaintiff relied on the information or advice given. 
While this will obviously be a question of fact to be deter-
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mined on an individual case basis, it is not difficult to 
envisage that an investor will accept the advice given to 
him by a broker as being useful and correct, and act 
accordingly. Particularly in the cases of unsophisticated 
investors or where the advice is of a very technical nature, 
reliance on statements made will be easily proved. 
The second component was that in the circumstances,it was 
reasonable for the plaintiff to rely on what the defendant 
said. Even if the courts adopt the more limited M.L.C. v. 
Evatt interpretation, that the duty applies only to those in 
the business of giving advice, it is difficult to see how 
brokers could escape the duty. In hanging out his "shingle", 
a broker is advertising to the public at large that he is 
prepared to give investment advice, and that he has some 
special skill or competence in the field, not possessed by 
14 
the ordinary man. A stockbroker is not someone who is only 
occasionally called upon for investment advice, for as Street J. 
points out, "The primary function of a stockbroker is to advise 
his clients and to act on their behalf in the purchase and 
32 . 33 
sale of shares." . Just as in the case of the bank manager, 
the stockbroker is in the business of giving investment advice, 
and can be similarly caught within the Hedley Byrne principles. 
Looking at the question of when a duty of care should attach to 
the giving of information or advice in terms of the leading 
New Zealand case of Scott Group, it can be seen that whichever 
of the tests of the 9udges is applied, the result is the same. 
Richmond P.,in the minority on this point, took the narrowest 
interpretation of the Hedley Byrne decision, in saying that it 
would be reasonable for the plaintiff to rely on statements 
made by the defendant where the defendant "was, or ought to 
have been, aware that his advice or information would in fact 
be made available to and be relied on by a particular person 
or class of persons for the purposes of a particular transaction 
or type of transaction." 3
4 In this case, Richmond P. felt 
that it would be going too far to treat accountants, who 
prepared the annual accounts of a company, as assuming a 
responsibility towards all persons dealing with the company 
r
1 
I 
I I 
I 1 
r, 1 
r, J 
I J 
I 
I 
I 
I 
I 
• I I 
I I 
I I 
I 
I 
I 
J 
J 
and in particular someone subsequently making a takeover 
offer. No such difficulty arises in the situation of 
the broker who gives advice, as it is perfectly clear that 
15 
the advice will be used by the person to whom it is given, and 
is likely to form the basis of an investment decision regarding 
the company concerned. The stricter approach adopted by 
Richmond P. could, however, limit the liability of a broker 
to third parties who obtain the advice or information 
indirectly and then act on it. 
Woodhouse J., on the other hand, preferred to adopt a straight 
test of foreseeability, based on the speech of Lord Wilberforce 
in Anns v. Merton London Borough Counci1,
35 which was a case 
involving ordinary negligence, as opposed to negligent 
misstatement. It was sufficient that the defendants could 
reasonably foresee that the accounts they prepared would be 
relied on by identifiable persons when dealing with the 
· · · f . 3 6 dh 1 . f . company in s1gn1 1cant matters. Woo ouse J. qua 1 1es 
this test of proximity slightly, by saying that it will be 
difficult in many situations for a potential plaintiff to show 
that the author of the advice should have foreseen that the 
plaintiff was within the class of persons likely to rely on it, 
and even more difficult to prove that the reliance was such 
as to be the effective cause of the loss.
37 Applying the 
Anns test to the situation of the broker giving advice, 
reliance on that advice by at least the recipient and his 
immediate family,would be reasonably foreseeable. The advice is 
given with the express design that it will in fact be relied 
upon. 
Cooke J. formed the majority with Richmond P. in agreeing that 
the plaintiffs could not recover in this case. However, he 
felt that a duty of care did arise between the defendant 
accountants, and the plaintiffs, as did Woodhouse J. Cooke J. 
professed to adopt the test of foreseeability set out in the 
Anns case also, but in applying the test to the facts he limited 
its operation to an extent. Cooke J. emphasised that on the 
basis of the published accounts of the company in question, 
the eventuality of a takeover must have been reasonably fore-
seeable as virtually inevitable.
38 Therefore, whilst 
Woodhouse J. may have only required a foresight that the 
information or advice would be used in significant dealings 
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with the company, Cooke J. seems to require foresight of the 
particular (inevitable) use to which the advice would be put. 
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In either situation, the use of a stockbroker's advice as the 
basis of an investment decision would fit within either category 
of being reasonably foreseeable. 
Whether the duty of care should extend to cover third parties 
who become aware of the information or advice, is perhaps a 
more difficult question to answer. In the Canadian case of 
Central B.C. Planners Ltd v Hocker, 39 a securities salesman 
employed by a firm of stockbrokers received information which 
led him to believe, mistakenly, that a strike had been made at 
a particular oil well. He telephoned a second salesman for 
confirmation, telling him that he had orders to buy a substantial 
number of shares in the company which owned the well. This 
second salesman then represented to several customers that there 
had been an oil discovery,and that there was major buying interest 
in the shares. These customers purchased a substantial number 
of the shares and because of the inaccuracy of the representat-
ions suffered a financial loss. The British Columbia Court of 
Appeal held the second salesman liable, because his relationship 
with the customers was such that he was under a duty to exercise 
reasonable care in giving advice, and had failed to do so. 
In addition, but for the fact that the representations made 
by the second salesman were so different from those which had 
been made to him, the first salesman would also have been liable 
to the customers, because he knew or should have known that 
the information conveyed to the second salesman would be passed 
on to customers of the firm. 
The Central B.C. Planners Ltd case can hardly be interpreted 
as standing for the proposition that anyone who relies on advice 
or information given should have a duty of care owed to them 
by the person who originally formulated the representation. 
Rather, the case shows that in limited circumstances it is 
reasonably foreseeable that a certain class of persons will 
rely on the statements, even though they have been received 
indirectly. This is in accordance with the test established 
by Richmond P. in Scott Group, where the particular person 
40 or class of persons had to be reasonably foreseeable. 
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Therefore, where a stockbroker gives investment advice to 
a person, it is reasonably foreseeable, and indeed likely, 
that that advice will be passed on to and relied upon by 
members of that person's immediate family. Where the advice 
goes further than this, however, for example if a market letter 
sent to a client is circulated amongst the business colleagues 
of that client, Richmond P. would probably say that they 
ceased to be part of a distinct foreseeable class of persons, 
and hence they were owed no duty of care. Woodhouse and Cooke JJ. 
on the other hand might be prepared to admit that the reliance 
of even this wider group was foreseeable, although the question 
of the reasonableness of reliance would surely be a negativing 
factor to a duty of care in such a situation. 
The approach of all three of the judges in the Scott Group 
case was to consider whether, in the circumstances, it was 
reasonable to say that the defendants had assumed a duty 
of care. The focus was on whether it was reasonably foreseeable 
that the plaintiffs would rely on the statements made. It was 
probably implicit that the reliance placed by the plaintiffs 
would, in those particular circumstances, be reasonable, the 
statements being of a factual nature and released in a business 
context. In the Hedley Byrne decision, howeverr it was specif-
ically emphasised that not only did the reliance have to be 
foreseeable, it had also to be reasonable in the circumstances. 41 
Thus a broker cannot be held liable for every statement he makes 
which may foreseeably be relied upon ~ : there must be reasonable-
ness of reliance. 
The stock market being inherently unpredictable, it can be 
argued that it is unreasonable to expect a broker's advice to 
be correct all the time. People investing in shares on the 
strength of a recommendation made to them by a broker should 
accept that they may lose money in the market, and that no-one 
will be answerable for the loss. This seemingly attractive 
argument fails to take into account the different types of advice 
given by brokers, and the different circumstances in which it is 
given. Such advice can range from purely factual information 
about the yield of a fixed interest security, to an opinion as 
to the credit-worthiness of a particular public company, to a 
guess as to the prospects of a speculative mining company. 
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Similarly, the circumstances in which the advice is given 
can have a large bearing upon whether reliance on the advice 
is reasonable. Where a detailed report is prepared for a 
particular client, it would be easier to show reasonable 
reliance than where a 'market report' dealing with a number 
18 
of securities in a general way is sent out to clients. It is 
too simplistic an argument to say that because a stockbroker 
gives the advice, and he is concerned with an unpredictable 
market, he can never be held to have assumed a duty of care in 
making the statement. 
In the recently decided English High Court case of Stafford v. 
Conti Commodity Services Ltd, 42 Mocatta J. accepted that, in 
the case of a commodity broker who gave investment advice as 
to the futures markets, there was a "special relationship" 
created between broker and client, and a duty of care was 
therefore owed. It was implicit that it was reasonable for 
a client to rely on the broker's advice, and the case turned 
on the strength of the standard of care applicable: 
I am also satisfied that with the best advice in 
the world, in such an unpredictable market as this, 
it would require exceedingly strong evidence from 
expert brokers in relation to individual transactions 
43 to establish negligence on the part of the defendants. 
Thus Mocatta J. was prepared to extend the Hedley Byrne 
principles to a broker-client relationship in saying that it 
would be reasonable for a client to rely on investment / 
recommendations made to him. A major limit to a possibly 
endless flood of claims, however, was that very specific 
evidence of negligence would have to be proved. 
The nature of the standard of care applicable was also 
considered in Woods v. Martins Bank Ltd,
44 
(which was 
d . dl ) S 1 J · d 
45 
approved by Lord Ho son in He ey Byrne. a mon . sa1 : 
Clearly the defendant Johnson was not negligent 
merely because his advice turned out to be wrong. 
Nor could he be negligent because he failed to exercise 
some extraordinary skill or care. His only obligation 
] 
( I 
. I I 
r 1 I 
I 
I 
I 
r I 
r I 
I 
I 
I 
I 
I 
I 
I 
I 
I 
r I 
J 
was to advise with the ordinary care and skill 
which the ordinary bank manager in his position 
might reasonably be expected to possess. 
Because the type of advice which a broker might offer can 
19 
vary considerably, the standard of care would be largely 
dependent on the subject matter involved. 46 The duty would 
be to exercise the due skill and care necessary and reasonable, 
according to the situation. For example, advice of a factual 
nature {and not covered by 'pre-contractual misrepresentation') 
would be more akin to the banker advising on another client's 
credit-worthiness {Woods v. Martins Bank Ltd), and a relatively 
strict duty would arise. On the other hand, where a recommend-
ation was made which predicted the expected future prospects 
of a company, then it would be more difficult to show that the 
broker had been negligent because the security did not perform 
as expected. {Stafford v. Conti Commodity Services Ltd). 
Therefore, where a broker provides information of a factual 
nature, any negligence on his part will be more apparent. 
Where the advice is more obviously an opinion, it will be 
more difficult for the plaintiff to show that the defendant 
has been negligent. Also, the circumstances in which the 
advice is ·given, and the range of recipients, will go towards 
determining the initial question of whether reliance was 
reasonable, and then the nature and depth of research which 
could be expected from the broker in formulating his advice. 
Financial Interest 
In the Privy Council decision in M.L.C. v. Evatt, Lord Diplock 
was of the opinion that where the adviser had some sort of 
financial interest in the transaction on which he was giving 
advice, it might not be necessary to establish all the usual 
components of a "special relationship" which are normally 
required before a duty of care can arise. 47 In the M.L.C. 
case, a 'financial interest' on the part of the company would 
have removed the need for the plaintiff to show that the 
company was in the business of giving investment advice, or 
professed to have the special skill required for such a 
business. 
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This concept was approved by Cooke J. in the New Zealand 
48 case of Day v. Ost 
a duty of care will more readily be inferred 
when the adviser has a financial interest. 
Here, it appeared that the fees of the defendant architect 
were at least to some extent dependent on the completion of 
the buildings in question, which the architect was trying 
to induce by his negligent misstatements. 
Because a broker will receive remuneration from brokerage 
earned if a client follows his investment advice and places 
20 
an order, it could be said that he possessed a 'financial 
interest' and therefore that a duty of care should be more 
easily inferred. However, in the New South Wales case of 
Presser v. Caldwell Estates Pty Ltd, 49 Asprey J.A. considered 
the impact of the existence of a financial interest as an 
exception to the "special competence and skill" which the 
adviser had to have to be under a duty of care in terms of 
M.L.C. v. Evatt. He held that the 'financial interest 
exception' only related to situations in which the adviser had 
previously had personal financial dealings which qualified him 
to give advice because of the knowledge he ·had gained from 
them. In Presser, the fact that a real estate agent would 
stand to gain a commission if he was able to sell the property 
in question, was not enough to displace the requirement that 
he be shown to possess some special skill or competence in 
the subject-matter before his advice could be reasonably J 
relied upon. 
Similarly, in the New Zealand Supreme Court decision in 
Plurnrner-Allinson v. Spencer Ayrey Ltd SO Chilwell J. felt 
that a financial involvement was only relevant if it could 
give rise to an implication of a special qualification, skill 
or competence on the part of the defendant, which would qualify 
him to give professional advice. It has been argued that to 
accept any wider view of 'financial interest' would be to 
undermine the strength of the majority principle in M.L.C. v 
Evatt, and allow recovery of damages in cases where possession 
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of the financial interest was quite unrelated to the knowledge 
or ability of the adviser.
51 The Plununer-Allinson case 
admittedly adopts a restricted view of what could be seen as 
ambiguous words in M.L.C. v. Evatt, and a broader view is still 
open for argument in New Zealand at the Court of Appeal level. 
A good analogy can be drawn between the activities of real 
estate agents and stockbrokers. In each case, there is a 
prospective financial gain from commission or brokerage if 
a sale or purchase is made, and in each case, the client is 
likely to rely on the advice given regarding the property in 
question. The Presser decision suggests that this type of 
financial interest is not sufficient to change the requirements 
for establishing a ''special relationship". In the case of 
brokers, however, the issue is not whether the adviser has the 
necessary skill and competence to be seen as assuming a duty of 
care, for this is implicit in his being a stockbroker, but 
rather whether a financial interest such as his should make 
the reliance on his advice any more reasonable. It is submitted 
that this was not the type of effect that Lord Diplock had 
in mind in M.L.C. v Evatt ;
2 and that reasonableness of reliance 
should be based solely on the nature of the advice given, and 
the circumstances in which it is given. 
THE DISCLAIMER 
Up until this point, the discussion of the application of the 
Hedley Byrne principles has involved the implicit assumption 
that the broker has issued no disclaimer of responsibilit~. 
However, in a large number of cases, especially in respect of 
'market letters' and 'special recommendations', brokers do 
include at the bottom of the page some sort of purported 
disclaimer: 
While statements herein are believed to be accurate, 
no responsibility will be accepted for error or 
omission. 
While, prima facie, it would be difficult to imagine a more 
categorical denial of a duty of care, the existence of such a 
legend may not be determinative of the issue. 
I 
I 
I 
I 
I 
I 
I 
I 
I 
I 
I 
I 
I 
I 
I 
I 
I 
J 
] 
The question of whether a duty of care is imposed by the 
law in certain circumstances, or whether it is assumed by 
22 
the adviser, may be an important one. If the duty is imposed, 
the disclaimer will be less readily effective because 
the broker would have to be seen as expressly contracting out 
of a duty the law imposes on him. Where the duty of care is 
assumed by the adviser, however, then the presence of a dis-
claimer would tend to indicate that there was no intention to 
undertake such a duty at all. 
In the Hedley Byrne decision itself, their Lordships seemed 
to be in agreement that the duty was the one assumed by the 
adviser in the circumstances establishing the "special 
relationship". In that situation, where the adviser expressly 
declares that he is not prepared to accept re~ponsibility for 
the accuracy of his statements, he cannot be said to have 
accepted any duty of care at all. Lord Hodson said: 53 
They cannot say that the respondents are seeking, 
as it were, to contract out of their duty by the 
use of language which is insufficient for the 
purpose, if the truth of the matter is that the 
respondents never assumed a duty of care nor was 
such a duty imposed upon them. 
And Lord Devlin said: 54 
A man cannot be said voluntarily to be undertaking 
a responsibility if at the very moment when he is 
said to be accepting it he declares that in fact 
he is not. 
It had been argued before their Lordships that, as in the 
case of a contractual exclusion clause, the disclaimer had 
to be very precise to be effective. However, it was held 
that a general disclaimer would suffice, and that the 
'ff d ·d ·d 55 contractual situation was di erent. Lor Rei sa1 : 
In the case of a contract it is necessary to 
exclude liability for negligence, but in this case 
the question is whether an undertaking to assume 
a duty can be inferred: and that is a very different 
matter. 
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Their Lordships were unanimous in deciding that the 
disclaimer of responsibility which had been issued was 
effective .in this case, and that the respondents could not 
be seen as having undertaken to accept any duty of care. 
23 
The comments of Lord Pearce in the Hedley Byrne case indicate 
a slightly less strict approach than that of his colleagues. 
56 In discussing the words disclaiming responsibility he said: 
... they clearly prevent a special relationship 
from arising. They are part of the material from 
which one deduces whether a duty of care and a 
liability for negligence was assumed. 
Implicit in this statement is that there are circumstances 
in which the operation of a disclaimer could be ineffective, 
if all of the other material suggests that a duty of care was 
assumed. If the disclaimer forms only part of the material 
which indicates that a duty has been assumed, then it is not 
in itself of conclusive operation. Similarly, in the New 
57 Zealand Supreme Court case of Capital Motors Ltd v. Beecham, 
the relevance of the disclaiming words was also said to be 
"part of the material from which one deduces whether a duty of 
care was assumed." 58 
Barwick C.J. in the Australian Privy Council decision in 
M.L.C. v. Evatt 59 said that the duty of care was, in his 
opinion, imposed by law in the circumstances. He went on to 
suggest that because the duty is imposed, the speaker could 
not always except himself from it: 
But the fact of such a reservation, particularly if 
acknowledged by the recipient, will in many instances 
be one of the circumstances to be taken into consider-
ation in deciding whether or no a duty of care has 
arisen and it may be sufficiently potent in some cases 
. f h 1 · h · 60 to prevent the creation o t e necessary re ations ip. 
Thus, although he has approached the duty question from a 
different angle, Barwick C.J. would appear to end up with a 
result similar to that of Lord Pearce in Hedley Byrne, although 
the statement of the latter is less unequivocal. This 
suggestion of Barwick C.J. that the existence of a disclaimer 
is only one of the factors to be taken into account in determining 
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whether a duty of care has arisen, was not expressly 
alluded to in the Privy Council decision in M.L.C. v. Evatt, 
the point not being at issue. 
24 
The possible approach of the New Zealand courts in this matter 
is not immediately obvious, except for the brief comment of 
Cooke J. in Capital Motors Ltd v. Beecham already mentioned. 
In the Scott Group case, Richmond P. was concerned to limit 
the width of the duty of care so that professional persons 
would only be liable in circumstances where they knew the 
61 specific purpose for which their advice was required. 
He did not wish to see the situation develop in which profession-
al persons felt obliged to resort to a general disclaimer as 
negativing an assumption of responsibility. While his approach 
to the duty of care question was regarded as too narrow by 
Woodhouse and Cooke JJ., his reasoning is instructive : the 
courts should not force professional persons to resort to 
disclaimers of responsibility which would tend to conflict 
with their status as professionals, who should be responsible 
for their advice in certain situations. 
Cooke J. on the other hand was prepared to suggest that where 
the speaker could disclaim responsibility for the statements 
he was making, but did not, it would not be too harsh to 
recognise a duty of care. 62 Thus, Cooke J. seems to accept 
that a disclaimer will be an effective discharge of the speaker's 
duty of care, this approach being more in line with that of 
Lord Pearce's colleagues in Hedley Byrne. 
It is submitted that the approach of Lord Pearce and Barwick 
C.J. (and Cooke J. in Capital Motors Ltd v. Beecham), is to be 
preferred. Because it is the business of a broker to give 
investment advice, and because he clearly expects that advice 
to be relied upon, it would be somewhat inconsistent for him 
to be able to say, "this is what you should do, I stake my 
business reputation on it, but I accept no responsibility for 
any carelessness I may have committed in formulating the 
advice." 63 By hanging out his "shingle" a broker is announcing 
to the public that he is prepared to employ his special skill 
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and competence in advising members of the public. It would 
be unreasonable and inconsistent for him to be able to 
disclaim all responsibility on the basis of some fine print 
at the bottom of the page. If all of the other material 
indicates that the speaker was assuming a duty of care, then 
the presence of a disclaimer should not be allowed to override 
this evidence. 
In New Zealand, it is the general practice of brokers to 
include fine print disclaimers in all of the circulars they 
send out to their clients. Such an attempt to escape liability 
for any negligence in the formulation of the advice,would seem 
to conflict with the broker's professional status. If all 
brokers use disclaimers, then a person who wants professional 
investment advice has no choice but to go to a person who 
will give him advice, but at the same time disclaim all 
responsibility for it. Given that stockbroking is supposedly 
regarded as a professional discipline, it would not be in the 
public interest for the courts to refuse to accept that a broker 
may be under a duty of care when formulating investment advice, 
even though a disclaimer of responsibility has been issued. 
A subsidiary point to be made is that a stockbroker is unlikely 
to use disclaimers in every context of giving investment 
advice. For example, where the advice is given orally, or in 
response to an individual request, no disclaimer is likely 
to be attached because the broker feels that such an attachment 
would reflect badly on his personal integrity as a professional. 
Also where advice received with a disclaimer attached is Rassed 
on to a third person, that disclaimer is likely to be inoperative. 
Therefore, even if a strict interpretation of the operation of 
disclaimers is adopted by the courts in New Zealand, stockbrokers 
can still be liable for negligence where a disclaimer is not 
issued, or is not given directly to the recipient of the advice. 
CAUSATION AND DAMAGES 
Where the plaintiff has been able to establish the existence 
of a duty of care on the part of the broker, and a breach of 
that duty, he will still have to prove that the negligent 
advice actually caused the loss alleged. 
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64 In Stafford v. Conti Commodity Services Ltd Mocatta J . 
held that the plaintiff had not established the required 
causal link, because he admitted that he only followed his 
broker's advice on some occasions, and was not therefore 
placing the requisite reliance on the statements made. Also, 
losses made · on the market did not of themselves provide 
evidence of negligence on the part of the broker, 65 and the 
plaintiff would have to have shown that other experienced and 
careful brokers would not have given the same advice at 
the time. 66 
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An additional point arises from the judgment of Cooke J. in 
Scott Group. 67 While he held that a "special relationship" 
existed, and there had been negligence, he dismissed the action 
against the auditors because he could find no loss incurred by 
the appellants. It was true that they might have successfully 
offered a lesser price for the shares had there been no 
negligence, but this was only indicative of the fact that a 
smaller profit was made by the appellants, rather than that 
a loss was incurred. A distinction was therefore to be drawn 
between damages in tort, which were for the harm done, and 
damages in contract, which were for the benefit promised but 
not received. 
Therefore, the plaintiff must show (a) the existence of a 
~pecial relationship", (b) that he relied on the advice in 
making his investment decision and (c) that he incurred an 
actual loss as a result. 
VIII CONCLUSION 
The legal description of the relationship between broker 
and client is variable, according to the specific circumstances 
of their dealings. This description in turn determines the 
degree of skill and care which the broker must adopt when 
giving investment advice, and the level of disclosure with 
which he must comply. 
I 
ii 
•• 
• 
I 
I 
I 
I 
I 
I 
I 
I 
I 
I 
I 
I 
Where the advice given can be seen as a pre-contractual 
misrepresentation, then the client will have an action for 
breach of contract, under section 6 of the Contractual Remedies 
Act 1979. The broker will be liable for any misstatements, 
regardless of his diligence in formulating the advice, and he 
will be liable ' t'o the extent of restoring the client to the 
position he would have been in, had the statement been correct. 
Where there is a fiduciary relationship between broker and 
client, or where the broker is acting as principal, a duty of 
care will be coupled with a requirement of full disclosure of 
relevant material on the part of the broker. Courts have 
traditionally viewed breaches of fiduciary duties in a similarly 
severe way as breaches of trust. 
In most circumstances, however, contractual or fiduciary 
duties will not arise,and any action for negligent advice 
would be brought under the Hedley Byrne principles. While 
it would appear that any financial interest on the part of the 
broker is insufficient in itself to create a "special relation-
ship", a broker giving investment advice can be seen to have 
assumed a duty of care. The existence and width of this duty 
will depend upon the nature of the subject-matter of the 
advice, the circumstances in which it was given and the presence 
or otherwise of a disclaimer. It is submitted that while a 
disclaimer will certainly not weaken the position of the broker, 
its operation may not be conclusive. Given the difficulty 
a client is likely to have in showing that the advice was , 
negligently formulated, that reliance on it caused the loss, 
and that it was an actual loss incurred rather than a profit 
reduced, it does not seem unreasonably harsh that a broker 
should be seen as having accepted some duty of care to his 
clients in his role as investment adviser. 
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